There is growing recognition of the critical role of evaluations to generate relevant information to guide the decisions and actions of policy makers and project managers. Yet, there is poor understanding of the demand and supply of evaluations in many African countries. This study seeks to bridge this knowledge gap by generating deeper insights on the demand and supply of evaluations in Ghana, as one of the five country cases conducted by the regional Centre for Learning on Evaluation and Results for Anglophone Africa (CLEAR AA). Ghana was selected based on an assessment as having a high potential to develop evaluation capacity.
The objectives of the study were to understand the conditions under which demand is generated for evaluation evidence and the areas in which evaluation supply can be strengthened to meet and foster this demand. To achieve these objectives assessments were undertaken of: (a) the development context for evaluations in Ghana; (b) the demand for evaluation; (c) the various entities supplying evaluations and their capacities; (d) the areas in which supply can be strengthened to meet and foster this demand; and (e) pathways to develop evaluation capacities both on the demand and supply side, involving government, civil society, Parliament and voluntary organisations for professional evaluation (VOPE).
This study was carried out through a combination of desk review, including an analysis of existing evaluation products, and direct semi-structured interviews with a selection of key informants from across critical stakeholder groupings.
Key findings include the following: (a) practically all of the evaluation work done in Ghana so far has been development partner led, with little involvement of Ghanaian organisations and professionals; (b) the demand and supply of evaluations is greatly influenced by the sociopolitical context; (c) there is an enabling environment for evaluation capacity development in Ghana, given its deepening democratic culture as well as an emerging vibrant VOPE.
Based on the findings, the possible areas of interventions include: (a) using the Joint Assessment for Strengthening Monitoring and Evaluation and Statistics (JASMES) as a platform for evaluation capacity development; (b) supporting the development of evaluation policy in Ghana; and (c) supporting the capacity development of Parliament to demand evaluations as part of their mandate.
The paper also recommends that whatever actions are to be taken, it is important that the political economy of the country is taken into consideration. The key argument here is that the development of monitoring and evaluation (M&E) must be rooted in the sociocultural context of the Ghanaian people. As noted by Levi (2011) and Leftwich (2006), the way forward in promoting effective monitoring and evaluation, and for that matter, development is to focus on an approach that is best suited to the local social and political context.
EVALUATION IN GHANA
Centre for Learning on Evaluation and Results Anglophone Africa (CLEAR-AA)
Graduate School of Public and Development Management,
University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg
Drafting team: Prof. Samuel Adams, Dr. Charles Amoatey, Joe Taabazuing (Country consultants) and Osvaldo
Management Team: Stephen Porter, Osvaldo Feinstein, Salim Latib, Anne McLennan, David Rider Smith
Reference Group: Michael Bamberger, Derek Poate, Zenda Ofir, Robert Picciotto, Nidhi Khattri, Howard
White, Jessica Kitakule-Mukungu, Ian Goldman
Entire publication © Graduate School of Public and Development
Management, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg
This report is an output funded by the UK Department for International
Development (DFID) as a public good. The views expressed are not necessarily
those of DFID.
STUDY ON THE DEMAND FOR AND SUPPLY OF
EVALUATION IN GHANA1
For further information on this study please contact CLEAR.AnglophoneAfrica@wits.ac.za. The content of this study is the
responsibility of the team alone, and should not be ascribed to the University of the Witwatersrand, DFID, or any other
organisation or individuals.
There is growing recognition of the critical role of evaluations to generate relevant information
to guide the decisions and actions of policy makers and project managers. Yet, there is poor
understanding of the demand and supply of evaluations in many African countries. This study
seeks to bridge this knowledge gap by generating deeper insights on the demand and supply of
evaluations in Ghana, as one of the five country cases conducted by the regional Centre for
Learning on Evaluation and Results for Anglophone Africa (CLEAR AA). Ghana was selected
based on an assessment as having a high potential to develop evaluation capacity.
The objectives of the study were to understand the conditions under which demand is
generated for evaluation evidence and the areas in which evaluation supply can be
strengthened to meet and foster this demand. To achieve these objectives assessments were
undertaken of: (a) the development context for evaluations in Ghana; (b) the demand for
evaluation; (c) the various entities supplying evaluations and their capacities; (d) the areas in
which supply can be strengthened to meet and foster this demand; and (e) pathways to
develop evaluation capacities both on the demand and supply side, involving government, civil
society, Parliament and voluntary organisations for professional evaluation (VOPE).
This study was carried out through a combination of desk review, including an analysis of
existing evaluation products, and direct semi-structured interviews with a selection of key
informants from across critical stakeholder groupings.
Key findings include the following: (a) practically all of the evaluation work done in Ghana so far
has been development partner led, with little involvement of Ghanaian organisations and
professionals; (b) the demand and supply of evaluations is greatly influenced by the sociopolitical
context; (c) there is an enabling environment for evaluation capacity development in
Ghana, given its deepening democratic culture as well as an emerging vibrant VOPE.
Based on the findings, the possible areas of interventions include: (a) using the Joint
Assessment for Strengthening Monitoring and Evaluation and Statistics (JASMES) as a platform
for evaluation capacity development; (b) supporting the development of evaluation policy in
Ghana; and (c) supporting the capacity development of Parliament to demand evaluations as
part of their mandate.
The paper also recommends that whatever actions are to be taken, it is important that the
political economy of the country is taken into consideration. The key argument here is that the
development of monitoring and evaluation (M&E) must be rooted in the sociocultural context
of the Ghanaian people. As noted by Levi (2011) and Leftwich (2006), the way forward in
promoting effective monitoring and evaluation, and for that matter, development is to focus on
an approach that is best suited to the local social and political context.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS.............................................................................................................................................III
TABLES, FIGURES AND BOXES ..........................................................................................................................................IV
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS .........................................................................................................................V
2. DEVELOPMENT CONTEXT...................................................................................................................................3
2.1 PLANNING, POLICY AND THE M&E FRAMEWORK............................................................................................................5
2.2 POLITICAL ECONOMY ..............................................................................................................................................10
3. MAPPING EVALUATION DEMAND AND SUPPLY IN GHANA.............................................................................. 13
3.1 PRINCIPALS ...........................................................................................................................................................14
The Political Executives ......................................................................................................................................14
The Legislature ...................................................................................................................................................15
Civil Society Organisations .................................................................................................................................17
3.2 GOVERNMENT AGENTS ...........................................................................................................................................19
3.3 EVALUATIONS AGENTS ............................................................................................................................................23
Research Institutions and Think Tanks...............................................................................................................25
Voluntary Organisation of Professional Evaluators (VOPE) ...............................................................................27
4. PATHWAYS, OPPRTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES ................................................................................................ 27
4.2 SUPPLY ................................................................................................................................................................29
Tables, Figures and Boxes
TABLE 1: INTERVIEW RESPONDENTS......................................................................................................................3
TABLE 2: GHANA NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLANS SINCE 1919 ............................................................................6
FIGURE 1: NATIONAL M&E INSTITUTIONAL AND REPORTING FRAMEWORK..........................................................8
FIGURE 2: SUMMARY OF CAP SCAN RESULTS ALONG THE SIX (6) PILLARS ........................................................... 11
TABLE 3: STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES, OPPORTUNITIES AND THREATS TO M&E.................................................... 12
FIGURE 3: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR DEMAND AND SUPPLY OF EVALUATIONS IN GHANA ....................... 14
BOX 1: PLAN GHANA EVALUATION OF IMPROVED COOK STOVES....................................................................... 18
BOX 2: EVALUATION OF GUINEA WORM ERADICATION PROGRAMME................................................................ 19
BOX 3: THE FUNCTIONAL ORGANISATIONAL ASSESSMENT TOOL ........................................................................ 22
TABLE 4: ASSESSMENT OF SELECTED GHANAIAN INSTITUTIONS SUPPLYING EVALUATION.................................. 25
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
AfDB African Development Bank
Annual Progress Report
Center for Policy Analysis
CDD Centre for Democratic Development
CLEAR AA Centre for Learning Evaluation and Results for Anglophone Africa
CSO Civil Service Organisation
CSPGs Cross-sectoral planning groups
DANIDA Danish International Development Agency
DCPU District Coordinating and Planning Unit
DFID Department for International Development (of the UK)
DP Development Partners
ECD Evaluation Capacity Building
ERP Economic Recovery Programme
FOAT Functional Organisational Assessment Tool
GCEI Ghana Coalition for Extractive Industries
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GIMPA Ghana Institute of Management and Public Administration
GMEF Ghana Monitoring and Evaluation Forum
GoG Government of Republic of Ghana
GPRS Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy
GSGDA Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda
GSS Ghana Statistical Service
Ghana Youth Employment and Entrepreneurial Development Agency
Institute for Economic Affairs
JASMES Joint Agenda for Strengthening M&E and Statistics
JICA Japan International Cooperation Agency
M&E Monitoring and Evaluation
MDAs Ministries, Departments and Agencies
MDBS Multi-Donor Budget Support
MDGs Millennium Development Goals
MfDR Management for Development Results
MLGRDE Ministry of Local Government, Rural Development and Environment
MMDAs Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies
MoF Ministry of Finance
MOFA Ministry of Food and Agriculture
MOFEP Ministry Finance and Economic Planning
MOTI Ministry of Trade and Industry
NDC National Democratic Congress
NDPC National Development Planning Commission
NEC National Evaluation Capacities
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation
NPP New Patriotic Party
OED Operations Evaluation Department
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
PAC Public Accounts Committee
PD Paris Declaration (on Aid Effectiveness)
PEOU Policy Evaluation and Oversight Unit
PPMED Policy, Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation Directorate
PRSP Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
Regional Coordinating and Planning Unit
Research, Statistics, Information and Public Relations
SAP Structural Adjustment Programmes
Netherlands Development Organisation, Ghana
Trade Union Congress
UK United Kingdom
UNFPA United Nations Population Fund
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund
USAID United States Agency for International Development
VOPE Voluntary Organisations for Professional Evaluation
WB World Bank
WIDER World Institute for Development Economics Research
1. This study reports on findings concerning the demand and supply of evaluation/evaluative
research in Ghana. It is one of five country cases conducted by the Regional Centre for
Learning on Evaluation and Results for Anglophone Africa (CLEAR AA)2
, funded by the UK
Department for International Development (DFID). The fieldwork was carried out by the
CLEAR AA partner institution, the Ghana Institute of Management and Public Administration
(GIMPA), with the support of a CLEAR AA consultant, mainly during the period July 22 to 27,
2013. This study builds upon a previous case study by Amoatey (2012) on Monitoring and
Evaluation System in Ghana: With a focus on the link between planning and budgeting, also
commissioned by CLEAR AA with the South African Presidency.
2. This report maps demand and supply factors affecting evaluation and evaluative research. It
is hoped that national stakeholders and those supporting them will use this report to better
structure their assistance. Consequently, the principal audience of this study is intended to
be those interested in evaluation capacity development (ECD) in Ghana. In undertaking the
mapping of the evaluation context in Ghana, the study identifies latent and actual demand,
the conditions under which demand is generated and potential sources of supply, with an
explicit consideration of the political economy of the country3
3. This study refers to evaluation as covering both evaluation and evaluative research and
therefore uses the terms interchangeably. The primary objectives of the study are to
1) The conditions under which demand is generated for evaluation evidence; and
2) The areas in which evaluation supply can be strengthened to meet and foster this
The guiding questions that interface with these objectives are:
(i) On the demand side:
a) What has been the actual demand for evaluation from principals?
b) Where is there latent and potential demand for evaluation?
c) How is evaluation demanded in the current organisational arrangements?
(ii) On the supply side:
a) What is the range and capacity of entities supplying evaluation services?
b) How relevant are the managers and producers of evaluation to the actual
demand for evaluation?
(i) On matching evaluation supply and demand:
c) Where can evaluation supply (actual, latent and potential) be strengthened so
that it meets and fosters demand?
4. This study has revealed that actual demand for evaluation from the executive and
legislature has been very limited. The low latent demand is mainly due to the following
CLEAR-AA is based at the Graduate School of Public and Development Management at the University of the Witwatersrand in
Johannesburg. CLEAR-AA aims to enhance development anchored in learning, evaluation and results.
For more information on the definition of terms used in this study please refer to the Inception Report, dated 22 April 2013.
reasons: (a) lack of awareness that evaluation can provide relevant evidence. This then
leads to lack of actual demand for evaluations and (b) lack of adequate capacities to
commission and to conduct evaluations. In general, study reveals that funds allocated to
M&E are low, and particularly low for evaluation.
5. This study was carried out through a combination of desk review, including an analysis of
existing evaluation products, and direct semi-structured interviews with a selection of
informants from across critical stakeholder groupings. The rest of this section presents the
methodology of the study, and provides an overview of the stakeholder groups that were
engaged with in the study. The methodology encompassed the following overlapping
a. Establishing study commitment and support from key stakeholders;
b. Collating and analysing primary and secondary data and information of the
evaluation system (including available academic and popular literature);
c. Conducting a series of interviews with actors that fall within the space established
through the broad conceptual map; and
d. Producing a draft paper. Each of these stages is discussed in more detail below.
6. Establishing support from key stakeholders: Given the nature of the study, an important
initial step was to identify relevant national stakeholders who would be engaged with prior
to, during and after the collection of data. Whilst the study was conducted independently, it
is important that there is some level of active buy-in from key stakeholders to support the
use of the study. In Ghana, letters were sent to the Government via DFID to inform about
the study, while the country researcher made contact with a range of stakeholders4
7. Collating and analysing secondary data and information: The collation of and analysis of
secondary data covered policy, academic and grey literature relating to the political context
and the demand and supply side of evaluation. Included in this was data on size and scope
of evaluation initiatives within government and the supply that emanates outside of
government. Following the country research phase further primary and secondary
documentation was considered in order to substantiate the claims of the interviews and to
expand the information base.
8. Interviews with key informants: A series of interviews were arranged with key in-country
stakeholders. The design of these interviews drew upon the literature review. In particular,
issues of actual and latent demand and of evaluation capacities were explored through the
interview process. Data collection took place in a semi-structured way that allowed people
to narrate their story – with some probing taking place based upon the guiding supply and
4 Ministries for Health and Education were not included because evaluation studies in these ministries are well documented
(see also Appendix A for List of some Evaluations conducted in Ghana by sector).
demand questions. The data from interviews was analysed during the fieldwork, with
emerging conclusions refined and subjected to validation during the last set of interviews
9. Time constraints for both respondents and the study team impacted on the methodology
used and the number of potential respondents that could be contacted. Table 1 presents
the representatives of stakeholders that were interviewed in Ghana.
Table 1: Interview Respondents
Government Agents Evaluation Actors Principals
Institute of Statistical, Social
and Economic Research
(ISSER)- University of Ghana
Ghana Statistical Service International Food Policy
Research Institute (IFPRI)
STAR-Ghana, a multi- donor
pooled funding mechanism
(funded by DFID, DANIDA, EU
Ministry of Agriculture Ghana M&E Forum
Development Partners (DFID,
World Bank, UNDP, UNICEF,
Ministry of Finance
Consultants The Presidency (Senior Policy
Ministry of Local Government
Trade Union Congress
10. This study is a standalone report, which is part of the work done by CLEAR AA on evaluation
supply and demand in five countries. The findings of this country case are presented
according to the following sequence: the Ghanaian development context is described in
relation to evaluation, then the state of evaluation demand and supply is mapped, followed
by illustrations of supply and demand issues. Finally, pathways are suggested to develop
evaluation capacities both on the demand and supply side
2. DEVELOPMENT CONTEXT
11. The section presents an overview of trends in the political and economic development of
Ghana and the strategic direction of the country. It also discusses Ghana's political economy
and national development planning processes and how these are linked to national
budgeting process and monitoring and evaluation framework in the country.
12. Ghana was the first country in Sub-Saharan Africa to gain political independence from the
British in 1957. It has since undergone major political and economic transformation and
development. Over the past six decades, Ghana has experienced 11 changes in government,
which includes four coups (Guseh 2005; Adams and Atsu 2013). Ghana’s journey toward
democracy is seen by many as a reaction to economic challenges of the 1980s associated
with implementation of Economic Recovery Programmes (ERP) and Structural Adjustment
Programmes (SAP) (Ninsin, 2007). Deepening the democratic process was expected not only
to promote a platform for the emergence of a popular, legitimate, and responsible
constituency for continued economic reform, but to also create a new governance
framework for achieving sustainable development (Whitfield and Jones, 2009). Currently,
Ghana practices a multiparty parliamentary democracy based on the 1992 Constitution.
13. The Fourth Republican Constitution, which came into force in 1992, provides for a unitary
state governed by a President (and Cabinet) and a Unicameral National Assembly. It
entrenches the separation of powers and offers appropriate checks and balances. The
presidency has a four-year term and an incumbent can serve for a maximum of two terms.
Since 1992, Ghana has held five (5) successful elections and on two occasions (2000 and
2008) an incumbent government handing over peacefully to a new government. These
highly contested elections have helped to deepen and institutionalise democracy in Ghana.
14. In the most recent election in 2012, the ruling government party (National Democratic
Congress) won by a margin of less than 1%, after which the main opposition party (New
Patriotic Party - NPP) contested the election results through the courts. The proceedings
were broadcast live on both radio and television to enhance the transparency and
legitimacy of the court’s decision. After eight months and 48 days of hearings, the Supreme
Court of Ghana dismissed all the alleged claims of irregularity and fraud. The Presidential
candidate of the NPP indicated that he would not seek a review of the court’s decision, and
congratulated the President and asked Ghanaians to come together to build the nation
(Gurien, 2013). Freedom House Report (2013) shows only 14.5 percent of the world's
citizens live in countries that enjoy a free press and Ghana is the only country on the African
continent to have what they define as a free press.
15. Embedded democratic process is an important as it provides a strong mechanism for
periodic review of the performance of government. Further, within a strong democratic
regime, it is more likely that misguided or bad policies will not only be brought to light but
also challenged and appropriate changes made (Lawson, Boadi, Ghartey, Killick, Agha and
16. On the economic front, Ghana has a diverse and rich resource base, with estimated 2013
gross domestic product (GDP) per capita of USD 1670. According to the African
Development Bank (AfDB 2013), economic growth for 2012 was 7.1%, driven by oil
revenues, the services sector and the strong export performance of cocoa and gold.
Ghana's consistent economic growth has impacted positively on poverty reduction.
According to the World Bank (2013), poverty at $2 per day dropped from 77% in 1992 to
63% in 1998, to 51.8% in 2006. Extreme poverty at $1.25 per day fell from 51% in 1992, to
39% in 1998, to 26% in 2006. Ghana is projected to meet the MDG of reducing extreme
poverty before the 2015 deadline (GOG, 2010). Other MDGs that are on track include
universal primary education, promotion of gender equality, empowerment of women, and
combating HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases (AfDB, 2013).
17. Although the country attained a middle income status in 2010, it remains somewhat
dependent on international financial and technical assistance. Despite the decline in
poverty, geographical, gender and disparities in poverty levels based on economic activity
of population exist across the country. Poverty is highest among food crop farmers, who are
mostly in rural areas of the country, where inadequate inputs, credit and limited use of
technology lead to low agricultural productivity (Whitfield 2009).
18. Ghana gets development aid in the form of budgetary and project support. The net official
development assistance and official aid received (aid/GDP) to Ghana increased from 0.2% in
1960 to 2% in 1970, 4% in 1980, 9.5 % in 1990 and peaked to a high of 16% in 2004. By
2011, however, the amount received had reduced to 4.5% (World Bank 2013). The
Government of Ghana (GoG) and its main development partners introduced multi-donor
budgetary support (MDBS) in 2003. It’s objective is to improve aid effectiveness by aligning
development assistance to government’s aim of attaining the MDGs and middle income
status by 2015 and 2020 and enhance the predictability of aid to this end. About a third of
external assistance is channelled directly through the consolidated funds. The resource
triggers under the MDBS are based on government’s own fiscal and development targets
agreed with the donor partners, which are in turn based on government’s medium-term
development plans (Lawson et al 2007; Osei, 2012). In fact, the Ghana Aid Policy and
Strategy (2010-2015) identifies General Budget Support or Sector Budget support as the
preferred delivery mechanism. While Ghana is on-track toward achieving some of the MDGs,
it achieved a middle-income status in 2010, about five years earlier than the original target.
Accordingly, the Ghana Aid Policy and Strategy aims to ensure aid effectiveness by aligning
aid to Ghana's national development priorities and serves as a guide to government,
development partners, civil society organisations and other stakeholders in the
management and coordination of external aid in Ghana.
2.1 Planning, Policy and the M&E framework
19. Development planning started during colonial rule. Over the last 95 years, Ghana has gone
through 13 national development plans prepared by various governments and with varying
degrees of implementation and success (see Table 2). The country's first ever development
plan, the ‘Guggisburg Plan’, was developed in 1919 and implemented between 1920 and
1927. The primary objective of that plan was to build a model economy in Africa through
large investment in infrastructure, health, education and agricultural diversification. The
plan was to lay a solid foundation for Ghana's future socio-economic development.
20. The second development plan was the 1951 ten-year development plan that was launched
by the colonial government and later consolidated as an ambitious five-year development
plan by Kwame Nkrumah’s government. The third and most noteworthy development plan
was the comprehensive seven-year development plan for national reconstruction and
development (1963/64-1969/70) that sought a complete diversification of the Ghanaian
economy through import substitution. The plan included the Tema harbour and the Valco
aluminium plant. The first (Guggisberg) and third (Nkrumah) plans have been described as
the most popular (Owusu-Amoah, 2013). Table 2 below presents key national development
plans 1919 and 2013.
21. The most recent development plans are the Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS 1),
the Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS II) and the Ghana Shared Growth and
Development Agenda (GSGDA). GPRS I was a broad based development strategy for
accelerated growth and poverty reduction focused primarily on attaining macroeconomic
stability; improved environment for doing business; and improved political governance. It
focused heavily on poverty reduction programmes and projects.
Table 2: Ghana National Development Plans since 1919
Source: NDPC (2010)
22. A monitoring and evaluation (M&E) plan was established to track the performance of GPRS
I with respect to its effectiveness and to identify and resolve emerging implementation
bottlenecks in the policy. Monitoring results are documented and disseminated by the
National Development Planning Commission (NDPC) through annual progress reports (APRs).
The GPRS I M&E Plan was the first systematic attempt by Government to include M&E in
the governance framework and management process, at a policy level (Amoatey 2012).
The main challenges with the GPRS I M&E Plan were poor coordination of information from
district, regional to national levels, as well as weak institutional capacities, particularly of
NDPC and Ghana Statistical Service (GSS) (NDPC, 2009).
23. GPRS I was followed by GPRS II with the objective of supporting wealth creation for
sustainable poverty reduction through the introduction of growth-inducing policies and
programmes. A new M&E plan developed for GPRS II provided a more coherent framework
for monitoring achievement of development goals and objectives. It outlined the
institutional arrangements, roles and responsibilities, the major monitoring and evaluation
activities to be performed, mechanisms for disseminating findings and how the outputs of
the monitoring and evaluation system would be used to influence policy at the national,
regional, and district as well as sector levels. Betley, Bird and Ghartey (2012) argue that the
Name Planned Period Implementation
1. The Guggisberg Plan 1919 – 1926 (7 years) 7
2. The First 10- Year Development
1951- 1959 (10 years) 5
3. The Consolidated Development
1957 – 1959 (2 years) 2
4. The Second Development Plan 1959 – 1964 (5 years) 4
5. The 7-Year Plan for National
1963/4 – 1969/70 (7 years) 3
6. The 2-Year Development Plan 1968/9 – 1969/70 (2 years) 2
7. The 1-Year Development Plan July 1970 – June 1971 1
8. The Year Development Plan 1975/6 – 1979/80 3
9. The Economic Recovery
1983 -1989 (7 years) 7
10. The Ghana Vision 2020 – The
1995 – 2020 (25 years) 5
11. The Ghana Poverty Reduction
Strategy (GPRS I)
2003 – 2005 (3 years) 3
12. The Growth and Poverty
Reduction Strategy (GPRS II)
2006 – 2009 (4 years) 4
13. The Ghana Shared Growth and
Development Agenda (GSGDA)
2010 – 2013 (4 years) ONGOING
monitoring and evaluation of the GPRS in the areas of strategic budgeting and budget
planning could be improved.
24. The Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda (GSGDA) was implemented in 2010.
GSGDA focuses, in the main on:
human development, transparent and accountable governance and infrastructural
development, in support of agricultural modernisation, natural resource development,
particularly oil and gas, private sector development, ICT, housing and energy for
accelerated employment creation and income generation for poverty reduction
(NDPC 2010: xiv).
The framework also envisages protecting the environment and minimising the impacts of
climate change. The GSGDA includes a full chapter on monitoring and evaluation, which will
be considered later in this study. The implementation of the GSGDA is expected to end at
the close 2013.
25. The primary means of influencing public policy management with evaluation results is
through the national budget. This is done through state institutions and governance
apparatus including the Cabinet, Parliament, Ministry of Finance, and NDPC.
26. Ghana’s Constitution establishes institutional arrangements for undertaking monitoring and
evaluation of policies and programmes at all levels of government. According to the 1992
Constitution of Ghana (Chapter 8, Article 87, 2) the National Development Planning
Commission (NDPC) is required to “monitor, evaluate and co-ordinate development policies,
programmes and projects” at the request of the President or Parliament, or on its own
initiative. The National Development Planning Commission Act (479 of 1994) which
establishes the NDPC, while Act 480, on the decentralised development planning system,
requires District Planning Authorities to “monitor and evaluate the development policies,
programmes and projects in the district”. Accordingly, the NDPC has initiated a process to
provide a new national development agenda to guide the development of the country over
the next four years (Owusu-Amoah, 2013).
27. In addition, District Planning Co-Ordinating Units are expected to monitor and evaluate the
implementation of the programmes and projects of the District Planning Authorities within
the region. Regional Planning Co-ordinating Units are responsible for the co-ordination,
monitoring and evaluation of district development plans. The districts use a Functional
Organisation Assessment Tool (FOAT) for assessing local governments which will be
discussed in some detail in Section 4.
28. Each ministry, department and agency (MDA) is required to have a Policy, Planning,
Monitoring and Evaluation Division (PPMED) with responsibility for planning and
implementing M&E within the sector, at national, regional and district levels. Other key
institutions with M&E responsibilities at the national level include the Office of the
President (which established a Policy Evaluation and Oversight Unit (PEOU) in 2009, to
monitor and evaluate government policies, programmes and projects); Parliament; Ghana
Statistical Service (GSS) and the Ministry of Finance.
29. The NDPC is expected to be in continuous dialogue with the Ministry of Finance and
Economic Planning (MoFEP), GSS, Office of the President, Ministry of Local Government,
Rural Development and Environment (MLGRDE), other MDAs, development partners and
civil society on all planning and monitoring and evaluation matters. The NDPC works
through cross-sectoral planning groups (CSPGs) for policy formulation, planning, monitoring
and evaluation purposes. This multi-level design is represented through a diagram that has
been used in different publications (including the GSGDA and the current PRSP) to show
Ghana’s national M&E system (Figure 1).
Figure 1: National M&E institutional and reporting framework
Source: GSGDA/NDPC (2009)
30. Achieving the objectives of the national monitoring and evaluation system requires
adhering to common timeframes for performance review and reporting to government. The
institutional arrangements have been designed to facilitate active participation of
stakeholders to ensure that policy recommendations are relevant and actually contribute to
policy formulation and efficient resource allocation and use. The framework depicts flow of
training manuals and
build M&E capacity
•Assist to create the
conditions for M&E
•Guide districts and
sectors to develop and
implement M&E Plans
•Prepare regional APRs
implement M&E plans
•Collect, collate and
•Prepare district APRs
•M&E division of
•CSOs, private sector
TAs and CSOs
•Private sector actors
Information flow &
Key actors Roles
information from district to regional to national levels, key actors in the national M&E
framework and their roles and responsibilities.
31. There are three aspects of the M&E framework to note. First, the omission of the Ministry
of Finance (MoF), formerly called Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MoFEP).
Given the importance of using evaluation for decisions concerning the budget the critical
role of the MoF should be captured in the institutional arrangement and as critical to M&E
supply and demand. Second, the central role of NDPC is a challenge given the constraints
the Commission has been facing for many years. Third, the framework describes
information flows, actors and roles without any reference to purpose, that is, decisionmaking,
accountability and learning.
32. The MoF and NDPC would comprise the central management agencies responsible for the
M&E framework. The MoF is the key government institution responsible for the
mobilisation, allocation and management of financial resources and for monitoring
government expenditure. The NDPC advises the President and Parliament on the
performance of public policy and programmes, their impacts and on the need for policy
reforms. As a result of this unique role and responsibility, the technical responsibility for
coordinating the M&E system rests with NDPC in collaboration with GSS and MoF. Given the
strategic position of NDPC in the formal M&E system, it may seem logical to consider NDPC
the champion of evaluation in Ghana. This was the view in 1999, and it was also held by
some of the persons interviewed for this study. But although NDPC during the last decade
has been able to produce Annual Reports which are used and appreciated by the public
sector and civil society, the NDPC’s actual role in evaluation has been very limited.
33. It has been argued that this is due to a lack of funding, but an alternative view is that
insufficient funding may be a symptom rather than a cause of the problems faced by NDPC.
Indeed, as pointed out in the ‘Institutional Review of NDPC’ carried out by the African
Centre for Economic Transformation (ACET)5
, an Accra based think tank:
While the NDPC’s constitutional mandate is clear, the political economy has not been
conducive for giving the commission the authority and tools it needs to execute.
Strategies and programs are abruptly ended, especially with changes in government;
the organisational structure and processes are not suitable for its function; it lacks
the necessary financial and human resources; and it is under constant pressure to
attend to short-term social, political and economic needs. Consequently, the NDPC has
not occupied the apex of Ghana’s development planning system as spelt out in law”
This statement applies also to the NDPC’s role in evaluation. It is relevant in the context of
this study on evaluation demand and supply in Ghana. ACET’s findings and
recommendations (in the brief version that has been disclosed) proposes, “that the
president or the vice president should chair the NDPC to enhance its presence in the
See http://acetforafrica.org/services/advisory-services/ghana-development-commission/. It should be pointed out that the
2011 report has not been so far disclosed.
2.2 Political Economy
34. In June 1999 a preliminary diagnosis of monitoring and evaluation capacities in Ghana was
conducted by the Operations Evaluation Department of the World Bank, and in October
1999 a workshop was held in Ghana, focusing on the role of civil society in the assessment
of government performance (Mackay and Gariba 2000). After 14 years there have been
some important changes, like the emergence of a Ghana Monitoring and Evaluation Forum,
the development partners’ commitments reflected in the Paris Declaration, Accra
Ratification and Busan High Level Forum, as well as the Joint Agenda for Strengthening
Monitoring and Evaluation and Statistics (JASMES) initiative. However, there are important
aspects that remain almost unchanged, particularly with respect to the almost negligible
actual demand for evaluation from policy makers and civil society, and the limited progress
made by NDPC in promoting evaluation in Ghana.
35. The slow progress made can be explained by political economy analysis which suggests that
public authority and public goods required for development arise from domestic political
processes and contestation between interest groups. An example is the 13 different
development plans for Ghana over the last century. As noted by Owusu-Amoah (2013) the
major challenge that has historically faced the development of Ghana is not the inability to
formulate credible policies and strategies but rather the weak capacity to implement these
policies and strategies effectively and sustainably. Some of the plans were truncated midway
through the plan period due to resource constraints and more importantly changes in
government. It is worth noting some projects started by previous governments are
abandoned with change of government apparently due to political expediency rather than
efficiency use of recourses. For example, in Ghana, the NPP Government under President
J.A. Kuffour initiated affordable housing programme in 2006 which were at different levels
of completion but were abandoned with a changed in government in 2009. The new NDC
Government on assumption of Office in 2009 initiated new affordable programmes rather
than continuing what was started by the previous government. Such decisions are rooted in
the desire of any governing party to be associated with new projects, programmes and
policies. Indeed one of the priorities of President Mahamais to complete the existing pipeline
36. A ‘drivers of change’ study in Ghana by Booth, Crook, Gyimah-Boadi, Killick, Luckham, and
Boateng (Booth et al. 2005) argues that political transformation through party compettion
lies at the heart of reducing corruption and focusing the state on development. Other
drivers of change include: intensified competition between political parties; the free flow of
information, accompanied by an increasingly critical mass media and informed public
opinion; an increased role in national political, as well as economic, life of the diaspora of
Ghanaian emigrants; vigorous growth of a civil society that combines strong social roots and
a healthy mix of forms of interest representation.
37. The relatively stable democracy and regular elections with changes in parties in power is a
reflection of the growing public demand for good governance and accountability that can
translate into tangible improvement in the living conditions of the citizens. In this regard the
one of the key drivers of change in Ghana is present and is becoming an effective
instrument to focus government and other political office holders who are likely to be voted
out upon results. Although challenges do remain in broadly dispersed patronage networks
in the Ghanaian state as shown by recent studies related to Policing (Tankebe 2013),
Logging (Teye 2013) and in regards to the economy (Kelsall 2012)
38. The growing public demand for accountability and results, seems to be an incentive for any
ruling government in Ghana to put in place mechanisms for self assessment towards
meeting citizens demands. In this regard the Government in 2011, through the leadership of
NDPC, undertook a self-assessment study of its capacity to Manage for Development
Results (MfDR) using a capacity scan (CAP-Scan) methodology adopted to Ghana's context
in order to identify its strengths and weaknesses, as well as to develop an action plan to
improve the delivery of public services in the country. CAP-Scan6
is a short-term diagnostic
review to identify and prioritise needs in the five pillars of MfDR: leadership, accountability
and partnerships, monitoring and evaluation, planning and budgeting, and statistics. CAPScan
uses self-assessment with guided questions and a measurement framework, to explore
these issues. An action plan is developed as part of the exercise. The Ghana CAP-Scan was
funded by the Swiss Government, implemented by NDPC and facilitated by the World Bank.
An overview of the national MfDR capacity rankings by results is provided in Figure 2 using a
4 point scale where 1 represents the awareness stage and 4, full implementation. The
ministries and institutions assessed were Education, Finance and Economic Planning, Ghana
Statistical Service, Health, Local Government and Rural Development, Roads and Highways,
Women and Children and the NDPC.
Figure 2: Summary of CAP Scan Results along the six (6) Pillars
Source: CAP Scan Ghana (2011)
39. As can be observed from Figure 2 above, the MDAs are improving their accountability
mechanisms but weak in areas like "leadership" and tracking of performance to feed into
decisions. The most serious weakness, as pointed by almost all sectors, is the low capacity
for the monitoring and evaluation of public policies” (CAP-Scan 2011: 7). The 2011 review
also identified weakness in statistics among MDAs, poor intra-ministry engagement in
developing M&E plans and poor coordination between government and development
Additional details about CAP-Scan are provided at www.mfdr.org/CAP-Scan.html.
40. Following this diagnostic study a task force was established under the Ghana M&E Sector
Working Group (NDPC, Ministry of Trade and Industry (MoTI), CIDA, UNICEF, UNFPA, WB)
which later developed what has become known as the Joint Agenda for Strengthening
Monitoring and Evaluation and Statistics (JASMES). The objective of JASMES is to provide
donor and government funding with relevant information for supporting programmes and
activities aimed at strengthening national, sectoral and district M&E and statistical systems
for the timely and sustainable production, analysis and use of quality data for evidenceinformed
decision-making, dialogue and accountability. It is expected to cover a ten year
period, consistent with the transitional arrangement under the GoG-DPs Compact which is
aimed at strengthening country systems for effective policy management and coordination.
The key beneficiary institutions are NDPC, GSS, MDAs, municipal, metropolitan and district
assemblies (MMDAs) and civil society organisations (CSOs). Table 3 provides a summary of
the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats (SWOT) of the M&E and statistical
system in Ghana. This SWOT analysis was used to inform the development of the JASMES.
Table 3: Strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats to M&E
Constitutional framework in place.
Rubrics of M&E system exist, e.g. NDPC, M&E
guidelines, M&E plans.
Multi Donor Budget Support Performance
Assessment Framework has triggers and
targets on M&E and statistics.
MDAs and MMDAs aware of the importance
of preparing costing M&E plans.
Quality of MMDA M&E plans is generally
Ghana Statistics Development Plan
Many potential M&E champions within and
outside of government systems.
DPs provide financial and technical support
to M&E and statistical activities, mostly at
sector level and specific household surveys.
Commitment and utlisation of M&E at
various management levels in the public
sector is poor.
M&E and statistics capacity within MDAs
remains low and the turnover rate of
qualified staff is high.
Collaboration between NDPC and MOFEP is
Release and disbursement of MDA’s M&E
and statistics budget is less than 40%.
Use of M&E data to inform performance,
planning and budgeting is limited.
Not all MDAs have M&E Units established
and many are poorly resourced.
Lack of an overarching M&E policy leads to
diffusion of roles and responsibilities.
APR is seen by many as the overarching
assessment of performance against GSGDA.
MDAs and NDPC focus on monitoring with
little attention to evaluation.
Dissemination of data plagued by user
unfriendly formats and communication.
Statistical literacy of media professionals
and the public is poor.
Incentives and rewards for and using M&E
data are limited.
Demand for accountability from the civil
society is limited. CSOs do not have M&E
systems to advocate for transparency and
Busan Action Plan for Statistics and call for
use of common results frameworks.
Results based financing is piloted in a
number of MDAs in 2011.
Sector Working Groups in strong position to
advocate for results management and
adoption of consolidated results framework
Decentralisation means more focus at
district level where M&E stronger.
Ghana Aid Policy and Strategy 2011-2015
lays out principles for improved donor
Ghana has achieved middle income country
Recognition that there is a lack of data.
Simple surveillance systems to fill in data
gaps at short intervals are introduced.
Mandates, roles and responsibilities
between different institutions (MDAs, NDPC,
GSS and OOP) remain unclear.
Untrained media practitioners are
interpreting statistical results incorrectly.
Overreliance on GSS survey and census for
data with limited mechanisms for more
regular data to inform annual performance
assessments in place.
Support by DPs to M&E is creates duplicate
and parallel efforts.
Uncertainty that comes with elections –
makes short term political and longer term
Data quality is important issue but is often
Source: JASMES (2011)
41. JASMES is based on four pillars considered fundamental to a successful M&E and statistical
system: (a) intensive utilisation of M&E information in one or more stages of the policy
cycle; (b) information that meets standards for data quality and evaluation reliability; (c)
resilience of the system to survive changes in administration, government ministers, or top
officials; and most importantly (d) leadership in the form of senior level commitment to
M&E and statistics, to the use of information and to ensuring a sustainable system.
42. The JASMES would adopt a system-wide approach by focusing on the strategies required to
enhance the national and sub-national capacities in M&E and statistics. Implementation of
JASMES requires sustainable funding for M&E and statistics activities by MDAs. In preparing
the 2012-2014 budgets MoF requested all MDAs to allocate between 2.5 to 3 percent of
their resources to M&E (JASMES 2011). Stakeholders of JASMES have proposed the
establishment of pool funds from government in the form of a lump sum payment and from
DPs through the direct transfer of funds. Government can make contributions based on
agreed annual work programme. The NDPC would be responsible for managing the pooled
funds in close collaboration with Ghana Statistical Service. Interventions would focus
primarily on the GSS, Office of the President (OoP), MDAs and MMDAs with the NDPC as
focal point for coordination, monitoring and reporting.
3. MAPPING EVALUATION DEMAND AND SUPPLY IN GHANA
43. This section presents the mapping of evaluation demand and supply in Ghana. The mapping
is guided by a conceptual framework represented in Figure 3. The framework includes
drivers that tend to stimulate various agents to demand or supply evaluations in Ghana. The
interactions among those who demand and those who supply evaluations then reveals
capacity gaps that if addressed could enhance effective demand and supply of evaluations
Figure 3: Conceptual framework for demand and supply of evaluations in Ghana
44. The analysis of principals includes the executive, parliament (or legislature), development
partners and civil society. This group of stakeholders is placed together because they
represent an array of the most important political actors who use and demand evaluation
and are distinctive from government agents and evaluation agents.
The Political Executives
45. The executive arm of government is a major actual (or potential or latent)7
demanding evaluations so as to provide evidence on the performance of various
government policies and to distil lessons to guide policy review. In this regard, the
Presidency established a Policy Evaluation and Oversight Unit (PEOU) in 2009 mandated to
monitor and evaluate the implementation of the policies, programmes and projects of the
In contrast to actual or effective, that is demand that is actually made, ‘potential demand’ is the demand that does not
become actual because of lack of funding, whereas ‘latent demand’ Is the demand of which there is no awareness but is latent
in the sense that there is a need for evidence which could be translated into a demand (for more elaboration of these concepts,
see the Inception Report of this study).
Source: GIMPA research team (2013)
DEMAND AND SUPPLY GAPS
Weak incentives for demanding evaluations
Limited capacities to deliver evaluations
various MDAs with the view of generating evidence to guide appropriate decisions and
actions that can deliver on the campaign promise of ‘better Ghana’. The PEOU developed a
web-based national data collection and analysis system that allows MDAs to regularly
report on the status of the projects and programmes under the Better Ghana Agenda. This
data system is called the Evidence Based Performance Management System (EBPMS) was
aligned to the political priorities of the government. Some key informants expressed
reservation that these priority areas of government, which are the focus of PEOU, may be
for political expediency and not necessarily linked to a long-term national vision. The PEOU
was also noted to have inadequate technical personnel to effectively deliver on its mandate.
46. Since February, 2013, the government appointed a Senior Policy Advisor to the President,
who is considered to be doing similar work to PEOU. Some informants expressed their
suspicion that the appointment of a Policy Advisor to the President was a ploy to side-line
PEOU, due to government discomfort with PEOU operations. The situation with the
development of the PEOU is evolving as the new President develops his executive
framework. These suspicions may have merit in view of the recent complaints by POEU of
lack of resources to undertake its policy evaluation and oversight activities and noncooperation
from some MDAs in providing relevant data. It is surprising that a unit like
POEU placed under the Office of the President should lack resources or power to undertake
its work. Furthermore, the NDPC is also expected to provide evaluation feedback on various
government policies and programmes to the Executive, which is similar to the role of POEU.
Amoatey (2012) reported of consensus among the key informants interviewed that, over
the years there are growing concerns and confusion about the conflicting roles between
PEOU and the NDPC. There is clear need for harmonisation of work and roles between
POEU, the Policy Advisor to the President and NDPC.
47. Furthermore, something remarkable in Ghana, in comparison with other SSA countries, is
the evolution of a set of restrictions imposed on the Executive (Fosu 2013). Even though
power is legally and constitutionally concentrated in the hands of the executive branch in
general, and the president and the governing political party, the situation has evolved
during the years towards a more diffuse power. This implies higher requirements for
evidence-based decision-making at the decentralised levels and additional evaluation
48. Parliament is legally mandated to approve budgets and authorise spending as well as
demand accountability for the results generated through the spending of tax-payers’ money.
The 1992 Constitution states that Parliament has full control over public finance. The
Parliament of Ghana is increasingly demanding accountability from some MDAs as the
various sub-committees of Parliament occasionally visit projects of national importance to
assess progress. Various Ministers have also been called to Parliament to give account of
specific aspects of their work. Furthermore, the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) of
Parliament makes use of Auditor-General (AG) reports in mounting public hearings on
irregularities identified in the report. However, issues such as the misapplication of funds
recurring over the years suggest limited impact of the work of the PAC.
49. For example, in the transmittal letter included in the Report of the Auditor-General on the
Accounts of District Assemblies for the financial year ended 31 December 2011 to the
Honourable Speaker, Office of Parliament, dated 28 December 2012, the Auditor-General
I had in my previous reports on the Management and Utilisation of the DACF,
recommended to the Honourable Minister of Local Government and Rural
Development to set up effective monitoring and follow-up mechanisms to track
actions to be taken on my conclusions and recommendations in my audit reports and
management letters (…) I wish to reluctantly conclude that the increased and
widespread instances of malfeasance and mismanagement of the finances and
resources of the Assemblies by public officials as portrayed in my current report under
review may be indicative that the Ministry has not significantly implemented the
admonitions and recommendations in my previous reports .
It is worthwhile to mention the finding of Betley, Bird and Gharety (2012) that training of
the media in the role of the PAC and the broadcasting of PAC hearings on radio and TV
served to generate significant public interest and, consequently, to raise the standard of the
proceedings (although not necessarily follow-up), as this can be one of the areas in which
ECD could focus in Ghana and other countries.
50. Despite various efforts by Parliament to demand accountability from the Executive, the
response has been weak and Parliament on its own has not commissioned evaluations to
generate evidence that can strengthen their demand for accountability. This may be
attributed to insufficient awareness among parliamentarians on the role of evaluation in
holding the Executive accountable. In this regard, Parliament has a latent rather than actual
demand for evaluations in Ghana. Further progress could be made by interventions that
could awaken Parliament’s demand for evaluations into an active one where they could
directly commission evaluations on issues whenever necessary.
51. Key informants during this study indicated that the demand for evaluations from political
leaders is weakened by the growing tendency of some political leaders to maintain their
political power through vote-buying rather than through an ability to deliver development
results that can convince the electorate. These continuing tendencies stand in tension to
the growing demands for accountability and performance from the public.
52. Parliament has a latent (rather than an actual or potential) demand for evaluation. The
Parliamentary Committee on Public Accounts, for example, could benefit from
commissioning evaluations on different topics given a Constitutional provision which
entitles the Parliament to request NDPC to undertake evaluations of policies. Their
presentations are televised and the press reports on them. The work that STAR Ghana
(Strengthening transparency accountability and responsiveness in Ghana) has been carrying
out with parliamentarians can be complemented with developing awareness that
evaluation is a source of evidence for their committees, thus transforming their latent
demand for evaluation into an effective demand.
53. Most of the evaluations in Ghana have been conducted by, or on behalf of, development
partners, driven by their own requirements to evaluate operations supported by them. The
triggers in multi donor budget support have become an incentive driving evaluations, but so
far the involvement of Ghanaian evaluators in managing or conducting these
evaluations/joint reviews have been rather symbolic. The development partners’
commitment to use and strengthen country systems (including evaluation systems), could
have been a potential incentive, but so far there is consensus among respondents that
donor have not been using existing local capacities for conducting or managing evaluations.
54. The major group of stakeholders who demand evaluations in Ghana are the development
partners. Key development partners in Ghana include World Bank, DFID, UNDP, FAO, GIZ
and STAR-Ghana. Development partners have taken the initiative, and the lead, in most of
the evaluations that have been carried out in Ghana. The key motivation for evaluations of
the projects they support is to comply with their own accountability and learning
requirements. However, if care is not taken to ensure that there is Ghanaian involvement
and ownership in these evaluations, it is unlikely that they will be actually used by the
55. In fact, there is no updated repository or inventory of evaluations carried out by
development partners in Ghana. The Ghana M&E Forum (GMEF) had a good initiative in
elaborating such an inventory but it was interrupted in 2010 due to financial resource
constraints to continue performing this function. The GMEF repository can be
complemented by the Ghana evaluations included in the Organisations for Economic
Cooperation and Development Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC) evaluation
56. The study on ‘Resources Spent on M&E and Statistics’ (NDPC 2011) provides an estimate of
the support offered by development partners for developing M&E capacity in Ghana.
However, the appendix included in that document on available funding alerts in a footnote
that “these figures should be interpreted cautiously as they may not represent actual
amounts allocated to M&E and statistics” (NDPC 2011: 87/97). In fact, of the 42
programmes supported by development partners listed in the 7 pages of the appendix only
one is related to evaluation, the JICA programme (discussed later). The rest are unrelated to
Civil Society Organisations
57. A major CSO involved in evaluation is the Ghana Coalition for Extractive Industries (GCEI)
whose focus is in tracking and advocating for transparent management of the extractive
industry in Ghana. GCEI periodically engage experts to evaluate aspects of the extractive
industry so as to generate evidence that could strengthen their advocacy agenda.
58. The Trades Union Congress (TUC) of Ghana is another CSO that has been advocating for
evaluations of some government programmes. For example, the TUC Policy Bulletin (June
2013) made a strong call on government to undertake an evaluation of the Ghana Youth
Employment and Entrepreneurship Programme (GYEEDA). This led government to
commission an independent investigation into GYEEDA which revealed some perceived acts
of corruption, which is currently being investigated by the Government. This illustrates the
need to clarify the distinction between evaluation and audits/investigations). The TUC has
practically no capacity to undertake evaluations (even though in its area there is a potential
supply from the ILO, about which they are not aware).
59. There are national and community-based NGOs in Ghana that undertake various
development projects with funding support from donors. As a means of demonstrating
results and accountability to their donors, these NGOs periodically commission evaluations
of their projects. Major NGOs in Ghana who occasionally commission evaluations of their
projects include CARE Ghana, PLAN Ghana, JICA, IBIS, World Vision, and Action Aid.
Discussions with some of these NGOs revealed that they have a strong commitment to
implement the recommendations from the various evaluations they commission since there
is an incentive for them to improve their performance through uptake of the
recommendations to secure funds. Furthermore, CSOs can contribute to holding
government agencies more accountable and responsible for the delivery of goods and
services as well as exposing malpractices. However, the capacity for CSOs to demand such
accountability based on evidence generated from evaluations is weak.
60. The positive interests of civil society organisations in knowing and improving the results of
policies, programmes and projects, and holding public officers accountable for those results
and for learning from implementation, can become an important source of demand for
evaluation, which development partners can contribute to strengthen, complementing
these efforts with the promotion of country-led evaluations, following up on their Paris
Declaration and subsequent commitments. Making progress in these fronts would
contribute to country ownership and use of evaluation results to enhance accountability
61. An illustration of evaluative work done on behalf of PLAN Ghana is shown in Box 1.
Box 1: Plan Ghana evaluation of improved cook stoves
Quality evaluation work (applying a theory of change and implementing a randomised control
field trial) was done in Ghana on a relevant issue (an improved cook stove programme) in 2009
on behalf of Plan Ghana (Burwen and Levine 2012). The cook stove programme is an innovation
which attempted to reduce the fuel needs of the rural population and achieve better health, as
part of the fight against global climate change.
The conclusion of the evaluation was that even when used, the new stoves did not reduce fuel
use or exposure to emissions by a large amount (if at all).
“By identifying whether a stove project has substantial impacts or not, the approach should prove
useful for non-profit organisations and others attempting to discern whether or not a stove project
is cost-effective at achieving its goals. The reductions in wood use we found are insufficient to
warrant scaling up the stove building programme, at least using the current design of the stove and
its roll-out programme”.
The evaluation was done by two researchers from the University of California, Berkeley, without
any substantive participation of Ghanaian evaluators. It could have been an opportunity to
involve Ghanaian evaluators and/or researchers, and this may have facilitated the dissemination
of an evaluation potentially useful but practically unknown developing Ghanaian ownership of
3.2 Government Agents
62. The major government agents who demand (and sometimes supply) evaluations are the
ministries, departments and agencies. In Ghana, most of the M&E work of MDAs had to do
with monitoring, and evaluations were donor-led, to comply with donors’ requirements.
Furthermore, the amount of resources allocated to (and by) MDAs for evaluation was very
limited: the baseline study on resources spent on M&E and statistics indicates that
evaluation accounts for a small proportion of M&E expenditure, 3% in 2009 and 1% in 2010
(NDPC 2011: 13).
63. All the Ministries in Ghana are expected to establish Policy Planning and Monitoring and
Evaluation departments which, among other things, are expected to undertake monitoring
and evaluation to generate evidence to guide policy and design of interventions within the
various Ministries. These PPMEDs do more monitoring than evaluations. Indeed, most of
these PPMEDs do not have the requisite capacity to undertake rigorous evaluations. They
do however prepare annual progress reports (often limited to implementation issues) and
occasionally commission consultants to undertake mid-term or end of project evaluations of
specific projects under their respective ministries funded by donors. There is also disparity
among the various PPMEDS in their capacities to deliver on their mandate.
64. An illustration of evaluation supply, combined with ECD, is the Evaluation of the Guinea
Worm Eradication Programme led by the PPMED of MoF and representatives of other
MDAs is provided in Box 2.
Box 2: Evaluation of Guinea Worm Eradication Programme
Guinea worm disease is a parasitic disease transmitted to the host through drinking or coming
into contact with water infected with water fleas. Work in the 1980s showed that there were
about 180 000 cases of Guinea Worm Disease (GWD) in Ghana, ranking the country second after
Sudan. It takes about a year for the disease to present itself after the parasite infects the victim.
The disease manifests itself with a painful, burning sensation as the female worm forms a blister,
usually on the lower limb.
Earlier reports indicate that because there are no drugs or vaccines to combat the disease,
preventing transmission is the best means of elimination and control. Preventive measures
include educating the community about the risks of allowing infected persons to enter sources of
drinking water, such as open wells or ponds; building walls or other barriers around water
sources to prevent entry; filtering drinking water through a nylon filament or something similar;
providing safe sources of water supply, such as capped wells or catchments with pumps; and
Perhaps due to its negative findings (which are nevertheless valuable to improve future designs), the evaluation is
not posted in the commissioning organisation’s website (https://plan-international.org/where-wework/africa/ghana/).
using temephos for chemical control. The effect of the GWD included closure of schools in
endemic communities due to large numbers of students being afflicted, farmers were unable to
tend their fields, and families became further entrenched in dire poverty. Estimated losses in
annual productivity in Africa ranged between US$300 million and US$1trillion by the end of the
1980s. In Ghana, the disease became an important issue because it affected fertile lands and
farm productivity. For example, it affected three of the highest yam production centres in the
northern region of Ghana.
In response to the negative effects of the disease, many organisations including the Carter
Centre, WHO, JICA and UNICEF collaborated with the Government of Ghana to establish the
Ghana Guinea Worm Eradication (GWE) Programme. The key implementation strategies
included (1) health education; (2) use of filters; (3) vector control; (4) direct advocacy with
water organisations; and (5) increased efforts to build safer hand-dug wells.
JICA conducted an evaluation of a GWE eradication project which provided an opportunity to
sharpen the evaluation skills of trained Ghanaian professionals. The Joint Project was evaluated
in 2011 by a team including JICA consultants and Ghanaian professionals. The evaluation report
showed that the GWD eradication programme was successful and the key contributory factors
included community involvement, strengthening surveillance and alignment to national
programmes. This evaluation contributed to the institutionalisation of M&E in health programs
across the country as most of the funding from JICA was linked to districts having M&E units or
personnel to monitor programme outcomes. Furthermore, in 2009, JICA supported the
establishment of a two-year programme to strengthen the M&E capacities of the MoF and
selected MDAs. Two categories of officials were trained under the project. The basic group was
trained in M&E while the core group was trained as trainers of trainees. Having completed their
training, the core group members were assigned to conduct the ex-post evaluation of the JPGWE
as technical cooperation by the JICA. The purpose of the ex-post evaluation exercise was to
sharpen the skills of the core group in the selected MDAs. It is to be noted that the Terms of
Reference of this evaluation stated that “the evaluation is part of a pilot exercise meant to enable
the Core Team of the Strengthening the M&E Capacity of the MoF and other MDAs to conduct an
ex-post evaluation of the Guinea Worm Eradication Project in Ghana”. The evaluation report was
used for the certification of Ghana as a guinea worm-free zone. Although most of the M&E
trainees do not currently work on M&E, the approach followed, combining training, study tour
and opportunity for practice in conducting an actual evaluation, is a useful approach that with an
appropriate selection of trainees could yield a higher benefit cost ratio.
Source: JICA (2011)
Ghana’s Constitution mandates the National Development Planning Commission (NDPC) to coordinate
the planning, monitoring and evaluation of national development policies and
programmes. However, NDPC has limited capacity in terms of staffing and resources to
effectively deliver on its mandate. For example, out of the twenty (20) technical staff within
NDPC, only five (5) are in the M&E division (NDPC, 2012). Furthermore, out of the NDPC budget
of GH₵ 429,394 in 2009, only 14% was spent on M&E activities (NDPC, 2011). In contrast, the
2009 expenditure on M&E by Parliament and the Office of the President was GH₵ 1,883,168
($1.2 million) and GH₵ 2,301,425 ($1.55m) respectively (NDPC, 2011). Even though the
mandate of NDPC for M&E is broader than that of Parliament and the Presidency, NDPC
receives less budgetary allocation.
65. Informants attributed the weak capacity of NDPC to the politicisation of the organisation
over the years. They cited examples of change of key personnel at NDPC with any change of
government, apparently to ensure that NDPC follows the priorities of the government of
the day. Despite these limitations, NDPC demands M&E reports from various MDAs,
including the District Assemblies to enable them compile an annual composite progress
report on the GSGDA which is the framework guiding national development. However,
NDPC’s annual reports are based on monitoring of interventions rather than on evaluations.
NDPC's mandate also allows it to undertake evaluation based on request from the Executive.
However, there is no evidence of any evaluations commissioned or conducted by NDPC. The
NDPC has recently developed an M&E Manual to guide and enhance the M&E function of
various MDAs and districts.
66. The Ministry of Food and Agriculture (MOFA) has over the years engaged consultants to
undertake evaluations of their projects. For example, in 2003, GIMPA Consultancy Services
was engaged by MOFA to undertake an evaluation of their Roots and Tuber Programme
(RTIP). The evaluation found that even though the new variety of cassava introduced by
MOFA had high yield, there were no marketing avenues to absorb the increased supply of
cassava. The recommendation for cassava market development was taken up leading to the
next phase of the programme focusing on cassava processing and marketing which resulted
in improved incomes to farmers. However, that evaluation was an exception. At MOFA M&E
is weak, and practically no evaluation is government driven. It is worthwhile to mention that
support from European Union (EU) was provided to MOFA to strengthen their capacities in
M&E, including an expert posted in the ministry for 2 years. But at best this support led to
better monitoring. There is no demand for evaluation (not even for M&E) from the top level
of the Ministry. The weak MOFA capacities for evidence based analysis and evaluation
related themes are considered in detail in the USAID/LEAD (2013).
67. The Ministry of Health has been implementing various donor supported programmes like
the Guinea worm control project and the malaria control project. The Ministry engaged
independent consultants to evaluate these projects. These evaluations were commissioned
to comply with donors’ requirements. The review of the Health Sector in Ghana,
coordinated by the PPME department listed several of these evaluations. With respect to
monitoring and evaluation, the review pointed out that to better promote and support
decentralisation the capacity of central and regional levels for M&E has to be strengthened.
This applies to human resources, systems and instruments. This activity could build on
several important initiatives, such as M&E and performance assessment, adopted in recent
years and adapted to a decentralised system. The key objective is to enable these systems
to produce reliable information at the district level. Finally, the review also recommended
strengthening capacity for monitoring and evaluation at central and regional levels (Saleh
68. Since 2007, the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development has been conducting
performance evaluations of Metropolitan Municipal and District Assemblies (MMDAs) using
a Functional Organisational Assessment Tool (FOAT). FOAT measures the performance of
MMDAs against some defined criteria and indicators and cash rewards are given to those
MMDAs that perform well. This has been a strong motivation for many MMDAs to improve
their performance over the years so as to obtain the reward. FOAT is discussed in detail in
Box 3: The Functional Organisational Assessment Tool
As part of its efforts to improve the performance of the District Assemblies, the government of
Ghana, with support from development partners, introduced a performance based grant system
since 2006. Under the system, the District Assemblies are assessed on agreed indicators on a
yearly basis using the Functional Organisational Assessment Tool (FOAT). The indicators for
assessment indicate compliance with the legal and regulatory framework as well as levels of
delivery on their mandate. The indicators usually assessed under FOAT include the following
(MLGRD, 2013): (a) coherence of district development planning, in terms of linkage with
situational analysis and good budgeting; (b) annual percentage increase in internally generated
funds; (c) amount of internally generated funds used for development projects; (d) transparency
and openness in financial management; (e) level of adverse findings or financial irregularities
from Audit Services; (f) procurement planning and management; (g) human resource
management; and (h) relationship with sub-district structures.
Independent consultants are hired every year to conduct the assessment of all the 271 MMDAs
in the country. Assemblies that perform well in the FOAT assessment are rewarded with
financial resources from the performance based grant system established by the MLGRD and
DPs. Those Assemblies that do not perform well are given capacity building support, based on
identified capacity gaps, to ensure enhanced performance.
Since a uniform tool is used to assess all the districts annually, it has become a basis for interdistrict
comparison. It is common to hear managers of well performing districts publicly boast of
their good performance. There have also been instances for citizens of a district to call for the
removal of the District Chief Executive when they fail to qualify during the FOAT assessment.
The incentive attached to good performance in the form of financial rewards and image
bolstering in the eyes of citizens and peers is a strong incentive for districts to implement
recommendations from the assessment team. The fear of agitation by citizens for the removal of
non-performing District Chief Executives is also a strong disincentive for bad leadership. Even
though FOAT is not a rigorous evaluation tool, it is a form of performance evaluation system
which employs carrots and sticks to ensure uptake of recommendations. The recommendations
are taken seriously and guide subsequent decisions and actions. The other lesson from the FOAT
system is the latent power of citizens in demanding results or improved performance from their
leaders. When such latent citizens’ power is activated through sensitisation, it could be a strong
force to enhance the demand and supply of evaluations towards improved performance by
leaders at all levels.
FOAT has contributed significantly to improved performance of many District Assemblies over
the years. For example, analysis of records from the FOAT secretariat revealed that in the
Northern Region, the number of MMDA’s which complied with the various assessment areas
increased from 33% in the 2006 FOAT to 85% in the 2008 FOAT (Engineers without Borders,
FOAT is seen as a better performance tool for decentralised M&E compared to the systems
developed by NDPC and the PEOU. FOAT findings are viewed as more credible because the
assessment is undertaken by independent consultants for the entire population (of districts)
rather than a sample. The FOAT is well respected by district administrators because the findings
are actually used in making supplementary budgetary decisions.
The limitation of FOAT is its emphasis on compliance to rules and procedures rather than
questioning the appropriateness of these rules, as expected in effective evaluation processes.
Besides, FOAT does not distil lessons that can feed into national policy decisions, thereby
limiting its value. But it has potential for learning and identifying critical success factors in those
districts that perform better. It may be desirable for the instrument to include results and
explore the possibility of extending the assessment to cover MDAs.
69. The MoF (until recently Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning) is expected to ensure
that MDAs are held accountable for the use of financial resources, demanding evidence
from MDAs to demonstrate effective use of budgetary allocations based on which
subsequent budget provisions are made. In this regard, the MoF tend to push MDAs to
generate the evidence that can support annual budget allocation as well as feeding the
M&E information into policy formulation and implementation. However, the capacity of
these MDAs to undertake effective evaluation, as indicated in the preceding paragraphs, is
weak and the evaluations are not implemented (except those that are donor-led).
70. The Ghana Statistical Service (GSS) undertakes nationwide surveys, which are used to track
the performance of development indicators like poverty levels and employment status of
population, allowing for comparative analysis over the years to generate evidence of the
development performance in the country. Such evidence feeds into various planning and
decisions by both government agencies and development partners, and also by the private
sector. Through the JASMES initiative, GSS capacity will be built to provide improved access
to high quality data by members of the public or non-governmental organisations.
Furthermore, GSS sometimes provides technical support, particularly on sampling, to
various consultants or agencies undertaking evaluations. In this regard, GSS indirectly
participates in the elaboration of evaluations.
3.3 Evaluations Agents
71. The various agents who are related to the supply evaluations may be grouped into four (4)
categories: (1) consultants; (2) universities; (3) research institutions and think tanks; and (4)
voluntary organisations of professional evaluators (VOPEs). The major agents in each of the
above categories will be discussed in subsequent sections, highlighting the extent and type
of their evaluative work and the driving forces underpinning their services.
72. There is a growing number of individual consultants and consultancy organisations that
have been undertaking evaluations or related work on projects, programmes and policies.
Among the organisations some that can be mentioned are the Centre for Democratic
Development, Innovation for Poverty Actions (IPA), KPMG, Ernst & Young and GIMPA
Consultancy Unit. The financial incentives associated with evaluation are the major driving
force for these consultancy organisations to seek opportunities to undertake evaluations or
related work (see Appendix A for an inventory of evaluations conducted by some
consultancy organisations in Ghana).
73. There are currently eight public universities in Ghana and plans are quite advanced to
establish two more in Ho and Sunyani. Additionally, there are seventeen private universities.
The University of Ghana is the oldest and largest with student population of 29,754 ranging
from bachelor to PhD levels. The University is endowed with highly qualified teaching and
research staff thereby presenting great opportunities to conduct various evaluations. The
2011 basic statistics of the University of Ghana revealed that out of the 654 teaching and
research staff, 412 of them (63%) have PhDs and 242 (37%) have Masters degrees. In
addition, the average number of PhD students graduating annually is 37 and the average
number of Masters students graduating from the university annually is 658 (University of
74. Generally, the public universities are more endowed with research capabilities than the
private ones. Apart from the Faculty members undertaking research work in the various
Schools and Faculties, most of the public universities have specialised research centres. For
example, the University of Ghana has four research institutes or centres that conduct
research to feed into policy. These are the Institute of Statistical Social and Economic
Research (ISSER); the Nuguchi Memorial Medical Research Centre; Regional Institute for
Population Studies and the Centre for Social Policy Studies. Indeed, ISSER in partnership
with the University of Carolina conducted an impact evaluation of the Livelihood
Empowerment against Poverty Programme (LEAP) in 2012, which led to a review of aspects
of the LEAP programme. Again ISSER evaluated the implementation of the Paris Declaration
on Aid Effectiveness in Ghana in 2010.
75. Interviews conducted with some researchers at the University of Ghana expressed concern
over low government funding for research work. Consequently most of the research work
in public universities is conducted with donor funding or in collaboration with other external
universities who tend to dictate the research focus which may not be consistent with
national research priorities.
76. A World Bank study in 2001 reviewed selected Ghanaian institutions to identify their
strengths and weaknesses in M&E, assess their ability to provide quality training as well as
undertake consulting work for government, civil society and the private sector. The
institutions were: 1) the Ghana Institute of Management and Public Administration
(GIMPA); 2) ISSER at the University of Ghana; 3) the School of Administration at the
University of Ghana; and 4) the Department of Planning of the University of Science and
Technology (UST) (World Bank, 2001). Some of the key findings of the assessment are
provided in Table 4.
Table 4: Assessment of selected Ghanaian Institutions Supplying Evaluation
Sources: Adopted from World Bank (2001) and (GIMPA Team, 2013)
Research Institutions and Think Tanks
77. Independent research institutions and think tanks like the African Centre for Economic
Transformation (ACET), IMANI Ghana, Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA), and the Center for
Policy Analysis (CEPA) occasionally undertake evaluations or policy research to generate
evidence and propose policy alternatives to government. Key informants lamented that the
uptake of these research outputs by policy makers is generally weak due to the polarised
partisan political climate and that these research outputs have been unsolicited thereby
weakening sense of ownership and commitment to take them on-board in policy decisions.
Nevertheless the work of these research institutes and think tanks is often recognised in
public debates and reported in local media.
78. The African Centre for Economic Transformation (ACET) is an economic policy institute that
undertakes policy analysis, evidence-based advocacy and advice to African governments to
enable them formulate and implement good policies and strengthen public institutions
towards accelerated development. The Headquarters of ACET is based in Accra and has a
core staff of 30 personnel from 8 African countries. ACET has undertaken analytical research
in areas like foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows; export promotion policies and
GIMPA ISSER School of
evaluation with a
the NGO sector
Design of survey/
Fiscal audits Baseline surveys
and NGO sectors
strategies; and education and skills development. In 2010 the AfDB engaged ACET to
undertake analytical studies to generate evidence to guide the Bank in its efforts to
promote economic integration among the 15 nations of the Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS).
79. IMANI Ghana is a public policy research and advocacy organisation. In 2010, Foreign Policy
magazine ranked IMANI Ghana as the 5th most influential think tank in Africa. Based on the
various policy research conducted, IMANI Ghana has often issued public statements and
provides policy alternatives to government on various issues like the proposed sale of
International Commercial Bank to the First National Bank of Nigeria; as well as the failure of
the Ghana Food and Drugs Board to effectively implement its policies leading to substandard
drugs in Ghanaian market (IMANI, 2013).
80. The Institute for Economic Affairs (IEA-Ghana) was established in 1989 with a mission to
promote good governance, democracy and a free and fair market economy. Over the years,
IEA-Ghana has served as a centre for policy analysis and public education on issues related
to Ghana’s economy, good governance and democracy. For example, during the
preparation of Ghana’s Oil Revenue Management Bill, IEA made recommendations that
were taken into account. Also the Institute is often asked by the Ministry of Finance and
Economic Planning to contribute to the national budget preparation process and the review
of government contracts. During the 2012 elections in Ghana, the Institute was actively
involved in supporting the democratic process by organising the presidential and vicepresidential
debates, as well as voters’ education and election observation. IEA-Ghana has a
core staff of 19 and produces a series of monographs on various economic policy issues, and
a new peer-review journal, called the Ghana Policy Journal. In addition, the Institute
published an Annual Economic Review and Outlook of Ghana in 2007.
81. The Centre for Policy Analysis (CEPA) was established in 1993 as an independent, nongovernmental
think- tank, which provides rigorous analysis and perspectives on economic
policies and poverty reduction issues in of Ghana. Over the years, CEPA has conducted
research in areas such as fiscal and monetary policy, trade policy, industrial policy, the social
sectors, and agricultural policy, based on which policy alternatives are proposed. The Centre
holds seminars and workshops to share its findings with Ghanaians and the wider
82. Innovations for Poverty Action (IPA) is an American-based non-profit organisation operating
in Ghana and other African countries, conducting randomised impact evaluations, with the
involvement of Ghanaian researchers. For example, in 2012, IPA was engaged by CARE
Ghana to evaluate Village Savings and Loan Associations in Northern Ghana. IPA was also
engaged by SNV to evaluate the efficacy of School Based Financial Education Programmes
with Children in Ghana
83. Ghanaian independent think tanks could become leading actors in conducting evaluations in
Ghana. However, most of these think tanks and research institutes have inadequate
technical personnel to undertake evaluations should demand increase quickly.
Voluntary Organisation of Professional Evaluators (VOPE)
84. The main VOPE in Ghana is the Ghana Monitoring and Evaluation Forum (GMEF), a VOPE
supported by UNICEF, which acts as an interface between supply and demand for
evaluations. Since its establishment in 2008, membership has grown from 15 to about 150
in an informal network within the past five (5) years. Official members (dues paying)
currently stands at 75. As a body of various evaluation practitioners, who are convinced of
the importance of evaluations, and who have a direct professional interest in evaluations,
GMEF is able to advocate and draw attention of some organisations on the need for them
to undertake evaluation of their initiatives. In this way GMEF contributes to activating latent
demand for evaluations, hosting important events with the purpose of nurturing evaluation
demand, including one in the northern region of Ghana. At the same time GMEF
periodically organises training programmes to enhance the capacity of M&E practitioners
thereby growing the supply side of evaluations. GMEF has in the past organised 1 to 2 day
fora to share evaluation best practices and discuss current evaluation topics (such as impact
evaluation), thereby strengthening the community of evaluation practitioners in Ghana. It is
currently undertaking the preparation of a feasibility study for a Master’s in Evaluation with
the University of Ghana.
4. PATHWAYS, OPPRTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES
85. This case study has assessed the conditions under which latent and potential demand for
evaluation is generated, the range and capacity of entities supplying evaluation services,
existing gaps in evaluation capacity in the public sector and the areas in which supply can be
strengthened to meet demand. This study has shown that there are currently active, latent
and potential demands for evaluation from different principals and agents. The mapping
exercise conducted and presented in Chapter 3 indicates that there are challenges as well as
opportunities for evaluation capacity development in Ghana. This section discusses deficits
in evaluation supply and demand and proposes potential areas for evaluation capacity
86. This section discusses the identified gaps or challenges with respect to latent and potential
demand for evaluation in Ghana. There is latent demand for evaluation for policy making at
both the executive and legislative levels of government. Development partners and civil
society organisations have demonstrated actual demand for evaluation and have been
active in supporting evaluation capacity development of public sector institutions as well as
other non-state actors.
87. This study has revealed that actual demand for evaluation from the executive has been very
limited. The activities of PEOU have been limited to monitoring of programmes and projects
rather than evaluations which could be used to inform policy.
88. The latent demand from the executive and parliament is mainly due to the following
reasons: (a) lack of awareness that evaluation can provide relevant evidence. This then
leads to lack of actual demand for evaluations; (b) lack of adequate capacities to
commission and to conduct evaluations across many MDAs, legislatures and CSOs though
potential exists; and (c) lack of adequate budgeting allocations for evaluations compared to
monitoring of activities. As stated in NDPC (2011) “monitoring activities accounts for
approximately 63% of the total expenditure on M&E. This is followed by capacity building
(25%). Publication accounted for 6% while planning and evaluation accounted for only 3%
respectively”. In general, that report shows that funds allocated to M&E are low, and
particularly low for evaluation.
89. One approach to driving demand for evaluation by both executive and legislative is the
development of national evaluation policy. Ghana currently has no evaluation policy that
provides a clear and coherent institutional framework for evaluation within the public
sector. The Presidential Advisor is undertaking work in the Office of the President in
developing an evaluation policy for Ghana. The guidelines will define roles and
responsibilities of stakeholders, as well as content definition and conditions for
commissioning, managing and using evaluations. This could be an area for ECD support, to
clarify government policy direction and framework for monitoring and evaluation at the
90. Development of a country evaluation policy can be done using two approaches. First, to
develop an evaluation policy, as has been done by South Africa, with a clear definition of
roles and responsibilities. It could be a Cabinet approved policy, rather than passing it
through Parliament, to avoid further delays. Second, to complete the regulations
considered, but not developed, when NDPC was established.
91. Parliament, by its constitutional mandate, is expected to hold government and its agents
accountable on how public funds are spent. The Public Accounts Committee (PAC) of
Parliament makes some use of AG reports to call government agents and political office
holders to account, but there has been limited follow-up. Currently parliament lacks the
capacity to commission evaluations on its own.
92. Development partners can support capacity development of parliamentarians’ research
assistants and perhaps also a sort of parliamentarians evaluation support unit (PESU).
Parliamentarians have a strong demand for accountability, which is a latent demand for
evaluation. STAR Ghana has been doing valuable work with parliamentarians which could
be further supported. The African Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF) is one institution
that can support such an initiative. ACBF is instrumental in capacity development within the
South African Development Community (SADC) Parliamentary Forum by funding an M&E
officer position at the SADC Secretariat. The M&E officer assists parliament with the design
and implementation of an M&E system.
93. The AG’s office staff is mostly compliance oriented, and they could strengthen their capacity
to undertake performance audits. This could be another area for ECD support, taking into
account international experiences and considering incentive schemes compatible with
94. The evaluation capacities of PPMED are very limited. Some MDAs do not have functional
PPMEDs, and where they exist, their activities have been limited to routine data collection
and activity reporting. Under the JASMES programme, Government and development
partners have committed to support ECD in the public sector. Planned capacity building
programmes must place greater emphasis on evaluation capacity development. One of the
key ECD initiatives could be evaluations funded by donors involving PPMEDs in managing
and Ghanaian evaluators in conducting the evaluations.
95. There are some promising opportunities for making ECD progress at the sub-national level:
the decentralisation process is strong and maturing. Statistical services are being
decentralised and there is an Institute of Local Government Studies which includes among
its activities, training on district level project planning, monitoring and evaluation. In
addition, there is an ongoing World Bank US$ 175 million Local Governments Capacity
Support project which aims to improve citizens’ engagement. The project is developing
capacities of urban district assemblies, which could include monitoring and evaluation
capacities (that may be linked to the decentralisation of the statistical services).
96. Most evaluations in Ghana have been commissioned by development partners and
conducted by agents of these development partners. The key motivation for development
partners calling for evaluations of the projects they support is to comply with their own
requirements to conduct evaluations of the operations they support, both for accountability
and for learning. Utilisation of these evaluations by the executives, legislature and
government agents has been limited.
97. There is a strong need for support to develop a country-led evaluation system. The
government could take an active role in requiring donors to follow their Paris
Declaration/Accra Ratification/Busan Forum commitments to use country systems, which
would be a way to contribute to strengthen these systems through learning by doing.
Supporting this active role could be one of the key ECD lines of work in Ghana and other
countries, helping to transform the proliferation of development partners’ different
requirements for conducting evaluations into an opportunity to strengthen country systems,
taking into account donors’ commitments and funds.
98. In Ghana civil society organisations have been identified to potential of acting as principals
to conduct and commission evaluations. Activities of most CSOs in Ghana are actually
funded by development partners. If their capacities are adequately developed, CSOs have to
potential to both conduct and commission evaluations especially at the decentralised levels
of government. STAR Ghana has been supporting evaluation capacities of CSOs in Ghana
mainly through training.
99. In Ghana there are significant gaps between evaluation and demand. In general, local
capacities for conducting high-quality evaluation are quite limited. The study identified and
assessed the strength and limitations of in-country institutions supplying evaluation. The
findings indicate that potential exists to build the capacities of these institutions to bridge
the evaluation supply-demand gaps identified. As can be expected an increase in demand
for evaluation has the potential for driving supply for evaluation. A first step therefore for
driving evaluation supply is nurturing demand for evaluation through the type of evaluation
advocacy events that GMEF has been doing and which could be further supported, and
through the dissemination of information about evaluations that produced evidence useful
for decision making.
100. An annual prize or award for the best Ghanaian led evaluation could be an incentive to
promote high-quality country led evaluations, which may not only have an influence on the
supply of evaluations but could also contribute to make more visible Ghanaian evaluations
and to create an awareness of their existence, which could be another way to promote their
use and thus to nurture demand for evaluation.
101. Some development partners have collaborated with evaluation agents (research
institutions and universities) on in-country evaluation capacity development initiatives. A
case in point is the partnership between UNICEF, GMEF and the University of Ghana to start
the first ever Master of Arts programme in Evaluation.
102. There is growing awareness at all levels of government on the important role of
evaluation in decision-making and sustainable development. Demand and supply and
evaluation continue to be driven by development partners with limited country ownership
of the processes. The introduction of the JASMES initiatives, if effectively implemented, will
help bridge the evaluation supply and demand gap by ensuring sustaining funding of M&E
and encouraging utilisation of country evaluation systems and personnel for commissioning
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Appendix A: Evaluations conducted in selected MDAs in Ghana
Sector Evaluation and year Commissioned by Conducted by
Education Evaluating the Efficacy of School
Based Financial Education
Aflatoun, a Dutch nongovernmental
Agriculture A Rapid Situational Assessment
in the Northern Region of Ghana
for a Climate-Smart Agricultural
Programme Development (2012)
Alliance for Green
Revolution in Africa
Financial and Economic Analysis
of AgSSIP Projects (2008)
Ministry of Agriculture
Impact Assessment of Upper
West Agricultural Development
Evaluation of three (3)
programmes of MOFA (2011):
Fertilizer subsidy programme
National Food Buffer Stock
Block Farming Programme
Examining the Effects of Crop
Price Insurance for Farmers in
Action (IPA - Ghana)
Health Improving the Ghanaian Safe
Evaluating the effectiveness of
alternative training models and
other performance improvement
factors on the quality of maternal
care and client outcomes
USAID Ghana Health
The Impact of Health Insurance
Education on Enrollment of
Microfinance Institution Clients
in the Ghana National Health
Insurance Scheme, Northern
Region of Ghana
Innovation Facility/ ILO
Action (IPA - Ghana)
An evaluation of the effects of the
national Health Insurance
Scheme in Ghana
USAID Ghana Health
Employment Livelihood Empowerment
Against Poverty Programme
University of North
of Ghana - ISSER
Impact Evaluation of MVP-SADA
Northern Ghana Millennium
DFID Ghana Institute of
Other Evaluation of UNIDO Investment
Monitoring Platform in Ghana
UNIDO University of Ghana